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Introduction
Most environmental policy debates concern peoples conflicting priorities,
as embodied in the question of people or ducks, and the problem of who
is to resolve the conflicts. The debate usually pits those who want to use
our natural resources to support our technology against those who wish
to preserve our resources in their more natural state. Conflict arises be-
cause both groups cannot use the environment as they wish. We must de-
cide collectively how to use our natural resources and who will pay for
technological advances. Such conflicts and the need for a collective deci-
sion are not unique to the environmental area. Decisions on land use
planning, transportation, education and national economic policy, to
name a few, all have the same characteristics. The choice of a particular
policy in any of these areas may benefit one group more than another and
possibly harm a third. Thus tracle-offs between 'people and ducks" and
the need for collective decisions are characteristic of nearly all public
policies.
It is the responsibility of our political process to insure that these dif.
ferent values and interests are taken into account when determining pub-
lic policies. Problems arising from environmental concerns and from at-
tempts to govern metropolitan areas are forcing reassessments of the
NOTE: This research was supported by grants to Harvard University from Resources
for the Future and the Ford Foundation. The author wishes to thank the many officials
in Minneapolis and St. Paul who were so helpful and James Q.Wilsonand E. T.
Haefcle for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The content of the paper,
of course, is the sole responsibility of the author.
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performance of our political institutions in meeting their responsibility.
We now routinely create new agencies and alter existing ones to deal with
the conflicts inherent in these public policy matters. In some cases or-
ganizations are being created to deal with particular problems, while in
others existing agencies are being combined into single superagencies.
Similarly, there is considerable debate and experimentation with decen-
tralization and local control over the administration of public services
at the same time that several areas are moving toward highly centralized
metropolitan governments. Finally, there are the perennial questions
about which officials should be appointed and which ones should be
elected, and whether elections should be by district or at-large. With
these debates anti changes going on, it is important to understand which
interests get considered, anti how decisions differ with different institu-
tional arrangements. The only way to gain this understanding is by look-
ing at specific decisions, the associated interests, and the performance of
various institutions. This is a case study of one such decision.
The question of people or ducks has been troubling the people of Min-
neapolis and St. Paul since 1968 when the Metropolitan Airports Com-
mission (MAC) decided to locate a new jetport north of the Twin Cities
and adjacent to a large game preserve and bird sanctuary, and the Metro-
politan Council (hereafter the Council) vetoed the Airport Commission's
decision. The conflict created by these vetoes still exists, in spite of several
attempts to resolve it by gubernatorial committees, threatened interven-
tion by the state legislature, and the efforts of a joint Airport Commission
and Metropolitan Council committee formed to study the alternatives.
This paper is an attempt to explain how two agencies serving the same
region reached such different decisions. The explanation illustrates some
fairly simple notions about the consideration given economic and environ-
mental impacts of such a decision by specialized executive agencies, multi-
purpose policy-making bodies, antI elected and appointed officials. Given
that there are a number of conflicting interests associated with selecting
a site for a new airport, the important question is how each agency and
each recruitment process weighs these interests, anti how the outcomes
differ under alternative decision structures.
The Organizations and Their Anticipated Behavior
The central participants in the airport decision are the MAC commis-
sioners, the professional staff of the MAC, the members of the Council,
and Northwest Airlines. The latter organization, in addition to being a
—I
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major airline serving the Twin Cities, started operations there, has its
corporate headquarters in Minneapolis, is a major employer in the Twin
Cities area, and has acted as the spokesman for the other airlines during
the controversy.
There are two important distinctions between the MAC and the Coun-
cil. These differences are replicated in many of the governmental bodies
involved in setting environmental policy and in governing metropolitan
areas. The first concerns the scope of the responsibilities of the two agen-
cies and the second is in the qualifications for membership and the meth-
ods used to select the members of the two bodies. The MAC, as its name
implies, is a single function agency whose sole responsibility is operating
the airport system for the metropolitan area. Its responsibilities are largely
administrative and its decisions have been made predominately by the
professional staff. The Council, on the other hand, is a multi-function
agency established in 1967 to oversee and coordinate planning and devel-
opment in the entire seven-county area. It has varying degrees of control
over all existing independent agencies such as the Sewer Board, the MAC,
and the Transit Authority. The Council also has the responsibility for
planning some metropolitan land use activities, such as highways, parks,
and public buildings. The Council's responsibilities then are solely of a
policy-making variety encompassing many issues at the metropolitan level.
Decisions are made by the councilors through debate and by roll call votes
as in most legislatures. The other difference is in the background and
selection of the members of the MAC and the Council. Five of the nine
MAC members hold elective office in either Minneapolis or St. Paul and
all members but the Chairman come from the two central cities, while
the members of the Council are appointed by the Governor on the basis
of districts which encompass the entire seven county metropolitan area.
Finally the MAC staff members are chosen by the Commissioners for their
prior experience and expertise in the aviation field.
The Metropolitan Airports CommLcsion
The MAC was created by the Minnesota state legislature in 1943 to end
the rivalry between Minneapolis and St. Paul for the most elaborate air-
port facilities. In part this rivalry concerned which city's airport would be
the base of operations for Northwest Airlines, and in part it stemmed
from the natural rivalry of the two adjacent cities. At that time, the MAC
was given jurisdiction over both cities' airports and any airports, present
or future, which the MAC might want to acquire within a 25 mile radius
of the two city halls. This has now been extended to a 35 mile radius.354 - JOHNJACKSON
The MAC was also instructed to provide at least one major commercial
airport located as nearly equidistant to the two city halls as possible. The
MAC designated Wold-Chamberlain field, which had been the Minne-
apolis airport, as the major commercial airport and proceeded to develop
it into a major international air terminal in the succeeding thirty years.
The MAC also administers five smaller airports scattered around the pe-
riphery of the metropolitan area.
The Commission is made up of nine members, most of whom are elected
to municipal offices in one of the two cities. These include the mayors of
both Minneapolis and St. Paul, one member of the Minneapolis city
council and one member of the Minneapolis Park Board, and two city
councilors from St. Paul.1 Each city also has one 'citizen commissioner."
These citizen commissioners are appointed by the mayor and city council
in each city. The ninth member of the Commission is appointed by the
governor and serves as chairman. The Chairman must not be a resident of
either city or of a contiguous county, meaning that he comes from outside
the Twin Cities metropolitan area. There is no suburban representation
on the Commission even though five of the six airports under MAC con-
trol and over 60 per cent of the metropolitan population in 1970 reside
outside the two cities.
The Commission appoints a staff headed by an Executive Director who
serves as the chief executive and operating officer of the Commission. The
legislation that created the MAC states that the Executive Director should
have business experience, preferably in the aviation field.2 Both men who
4
haveheld the position since 1943 have satisfied this requirement as have
the other members of the staff.3 The Commission has kept its administra-
tive staff small. As of August 1970, it consisted of 17 people, including
secretarial and clerical employees. This does not include about 200 other
individuals employed in operating the airports. The Commission has re-
lied to a great extent on outside consultants and attorneys as needed.4
The Commission has three main sources of revenue; charges for the
use of MAC property (e.g., terminal facility rentals, landing fees, etc.),
1. The Minneapolis Park board member is included because Wold-Chamberlain is
built in Minneapolis park land and prior to the MAC the airport was administered
by the Park Board.
2. Minnesota Statue 360,106 (4) (1969).
3. Short biographies of several of the staff members are included in an article, "Jet
Noise and Its Impact," Airport Services Management Vol. 12, No. 10 (October 1971):
16—26.
4. Donald V. Harper, "The Minneapolis.St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Commission,"
Minnesota Law Review Vol. 55. No. S (January 1971): 392."PEOPLE OR DUCKS?" WHO DECIDES? 355
federal and state aid; and support for its operations and maintenance
from the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul of up to one mill on all as-
sessed valuation. The two cities can also be taxed to pay for the prinicpal
and interest on the first $20,000,000 of airport bonds. After that the bonds
are supposed to be self-liquidating and the cities are responsible only if
the self-liquidating feature fails as the result of a default by a contractor,
such as Northwest Airlines. In practice, the levy for operations has ranged
between 0.05 mills and 0.465 mills, and there has been no assessment for
operations since 1961. The assessment for the payment of principal and
interest on MAC bonds has ranged from 0.460 to 2.445 mills and no
assessment has been made since 1969. Thus the Commission is now finan-
cially independent of the two central cities.5 The income from the charges
and rentals at the MAC airports accounts for most of the Commission's
income for both operating and capital investment purposes. As we will
see, this is a crucial factor in all Commission decisions.
The Metropolitan Council
The Council was created by the Minnesota state legislature in 1967 to
coordinate the planning and development in the seven counties compris-
ing the metropolitan area of Minneapolis and St. Paul.6 The legislature
instructed the Council to prepare a comprehensive development guide for
the metropolitan area which would state goals, standards, and programs
for both public and private economic development in the metropolitan
area. A Development Guide Committee was formed for this purpose and
now has the responsibility for making recommendations to the whole
Council about proposed construction or development plans by the inde-
pendent boards, commissions, and municipal governments in the metro-
politan area. The Council has the authority to suspend proposals that
it decides do not conform to its development guide. This is the major
way the Council has of influencing the decisions of the Metropolitan
Airports Commission, the Metropolitan Transit Commission, the Metro-
politan Sewer Board and other metropolitan agencies and governments.
liVith the exception of the Sewer Board and Transit Commission, all the
agencies have independent operating and financial authority and their
budgets are outside Council control.
The Council's additional power over the other agencies antI govern-
ments is limited and requires federal cooperation. Under existing legisla-
5.Haiper,"Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports," pp. 434—437.
6. Minnesota Statutes, Ch. 473 B (1967).
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tion, local proposals for federal aid for specific projects, like an airport
or a housing project, must be reviewed by a local planning agency, in this
case the Council. If the Council opposes the proposal, the local agency
may still submit the proposal, but with a statement that it was opposed
by the planning agency. In the case of such an appeal, it is up to the fed-
eral agency to decide if it wants to uphold or override the local planning
agency. Although local agencies have seemed unwilling to challenge the
Council on such questions, the Council's real power comes from its ability
to suspend new construction plans of the different metropolitan organ.
izations. This authority is not inconsiderable.
There are fourteen Councilors, each representing a single-member dis-
trict. These districts are aggregates of several state legislative districts and
are relatively equal in population. There is also a chairman of the Coun-
cil who does not come from any of the districts. All councilors are ap-
pointed by the state governor with the advice and consent of the state
senate. Although supposedly nonpartisan, these appointments have re-
flected the political affiliation of the governor. Councilors are appointed
to six-year overlapping terms so that four or five councilors are up for
reappointment every two years. The Chairman serves at the pleasure of
the governor. There is continual debate over having the Councilors
elected rather than appointed. This change would have to come from the
state legislature which has previously opposed such an arrangement.
The expected behavior of the MAC and the Council
In this section we will analyze how these two agencies came to different
conclusions about the location of the airport and use this analysis to ex-
amine how different governmental structures perform at resolving the
conflicts inherent in an airport location question. This analysis is based
on some simple notions about organizational, electoral, and legislative
behavior. The case itself is used to examine and enrich these notions,
which can then be used to suggest ways of improving the structure and
performance of environmental and metropolitan policymaking agencies.
The easiest participants to describe are the MAC commissioners. The
elected members are usually more concerned with the jobs to which they
were elected. The operations of the airport are only an ancillary function
and certainly are not as important as other municipal decisions in de-
termining their chances for reelection. For many years the mayor of St.
Paul did not attend Commission meetings, but simply sent a representa-
tive. The citizen commissioners are usually active in local businesses or
labor unions and are much more concerned with the operations of these"PEOPLE OR DUCKS?" WHO DECIDES? 357
organizationsthan they are with MAC decisions. The commissioners nor-
mally ignore questions about the airport and concentrate on their other
responsibilities. They will do so unless there is obvious concern or dis-
content with the operations of the airport system among their constitu-
ents. If such a concern appears, and particularly if the concern is shared
by a majority of the Commissioners' constituents, we should expect the
elected officials to react quite strongly and visibly. The most obvious is-
sues over which such discontent might be raised are the costs of the air-
ports if they begin to raise local tax rates perceptibly, poor and incon-
venient service to airport users, rising noise levels, and attempts to expand
the airport within the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul. The elected
commissioners are probably more sensitive than the appointed members
to these concerns if they arise. It seems obvious to expect the elected com-
missioners to be less sensitive to questions and problems raised by people
outside the two central cities, who of course are not in their constituen-
cies. Thus objections to a decision to expand one of the outlying airports
or to a new airport location outside the two cities are not likely to evoke
much response from the commissioners. In the absence of aroused con-
stituents, the commissioners will be fairly complacent about MAC oper-
ations and decisions.
A complacent attitude anti approach on the part of the MAC commis-
sioners aids the MAC staff members in fulfilling their objectives. These
men are professional aviators and airport administrators. Their likely ob-
jective will be to insulate themselves from as much external pressure as
possible so as to pursue the more limited goals of building and running
airports. These goals undoubtedly include accolades from professional
groups in the aviation field. The staff's performance criteria would in-
clude such measures as the volume of air traffic handled, the growth in
this traffic, their safety record, the absence of delays attributable to air-
port operations, and similar efficiency measures. Satisfying these profes-
sional objectives requires providing modern and adequate terminal and
air space for expected traffic levels and minimizing externally imposed
restrictions on operations. Obtaining the autonomy to pursue their goals
means avoiding things like tax increases, congestion delays, and noise
problems which are likely to cause the commissioners to become con-
cerned about the staff decisions and operations. Preventing or quickly
solving problems which do arouse the commissioners' concern will in-
crease the staff's autonomy and independence and permit them to pur-
sue their own personal and professional goals. In selecting a site for a
new airport, the MAC staff will be primarily concerned with their pro-
fessional concerns of available terminal and air space and the technical358 - JOHNJACKSON
feasibilities and costs of alternative locations. In the process of making a
decision, they will try to limit outside involvement as much as possible
so as to maintain their autonomy and their ability to follow the technical
objectives. Focusing on these more narrow technical criteria and prevent-
ing external involvement means that the MAC staff will completely avoid
the larger conflicts which surround the question of a new airport.
The objectives and behavior of the Council are the hardest to describe.
The usual model of such a legislative type policy organization assumes
that the members' responsibility is to insure that the interests and con-
cerns of the people in their districts are represented and have a chance
to influence the decisions of the agency. This responsibility is fulfilled by
having councilors support proposals favored by their constituents and
form coalitions with other councilors to promote programs which their
constituents consider most important to the metropolitan area. Explana-
tions of such a council's decisions are l)ased on knowledge of the concerns
of the people in each district on different issues and the coalitions and
negotiations likely to take place among the members. For example, coun-
cilors from districts where the people are concerned about the environ-
mental or economic impacts of an airport location can be counted upon
to raise these issues and to make sure that the final decisions reflect these
concerns. The cost to the councilors for not doing this effectively is heat
from their constituents and possible loss of the job.
Such a metropolitan-wide legislative organization would have a much
better chance than an administrative agency like the MAC and its staff
of resolving or at least of considering the conflicts inherent in issues such
as a decision to build a new airport. The sole responsibility of the repre-
sentatives in such a legislative body would be to mediate the differences
involved in public matters. They would not be rewarded professionally for
promoting aviation and their futures as councilors would not be pri-
marily dependent upon their performance in another job. At the same
time, since they would be elected on a district basis and because the
ceived benefits and costs of the airport are not spread uniformly through-
out the metropolitan area, it is almost certain that the questions of the
distribution of these benefits and costs will be raised, debated, and influ-
ential in the final decision of such a council.
Unfortunately this description of a metropolitan legislature and its
implication for public policy decisions is not completely appropriate here.
The legislative model relies on the assumption that councilors' prefer-
ences reflect the preferences of their constituents, which may not be a bad
assumption if the members are elected. However, the Council members
are not elected, but are appointed by the governor. Consequently the"PEOPLE OR DUCKS?" WHO DECIDES? 359
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councilors are likely to be voting their own personal views which are de-
rived from their social and economic associations within the metropolitan
area anti perhaps those of the appointing individual. Only the councilors
• who are quite personally associated with the interests of their districts
by virtue of residential associations or business contacts will act according
to the representational model. Even with this qualification on the be-
havior of the Council, its decisions are more likely to represent concern
for the conflicts associated with the airport location decision than are
the decisions of the MAC. Because of its young age, the members as a
group were quite concerned with establishing the Council as a strong
metropolitan-wide policy making agency. They were quite conscious of
their responsibilities to guide and plan metropolitan development in a
positive fashion. They were also making a determined effort to establish
their control over the decisions of the independent agencies which affect
this development.
History of the Airport Decision
The history of the airport location issue began in 1967 when the MAC
staff determined from FAA and Air Transportation Association data
that the existing commercial airport, would be made-
quate by This prompted a staff study on possible alternatives to
meet the expected demand. The search immediately focused on six pos-
sible sites, three north of the Twin Cities and three to the south. The
original purpose of the Commission, its charter, and its composition as
well as existing geography and airport locations precluded a site in either
the east or the west. The Commission had already done considerable
• work toward a future northern site. In 1950 a secondary airport for use
by general aviation was established in Anoka County, to the north of the
Twin Cities. Additional land was acquired and the airport expanded in
1961. Part of the justification for the acquisition of these lands was that
when a second major airport was needed, this land would be available
for further expansion.8 Unfortunately, in the succeeding years residential
7. This historical account draws heavily on an article by Donald V. Harper, "The
Airport Location Problem: The Case of Minneapolis-St. Paul,' ICC Practitioners Jour-
nal (May—June 1971): 550—582.
8. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Commission, "In the Matter of the
Expansion and Development of the Airport System by the Expansion of
Anoka County-James Field or Acquisition of Lands and Development of a New Air-
port in Anoka County, Findings. Conclusions, and Order," February 24,1969, p.8.
(Hereafter referred to as MAC, "Findings.")360 - JOHNJACKSON
development and the location of a series of television antennae made ex-
pansion of the Anoka airport unacceptable to the Commission.
Because of the potential of urban development and the distance from
both downtown areas, the Commission focused on a northern site called
Ham Lake. This is a 15,000 acre tract about 20 miles from each downtown
area and 25milesfrom Wold-Chamberlain. An additional advantage of
this site according to tile MAC was that it would not interfere with exist-
ing or any proposed operations at Wold-Chamberlain.9 The Commission
hoped to continue to use the existing airport for commercial aviation, as
well as the maintenance and repair facilities which the airlines were cur-
rently leasing. Their initial statements indicated a feeling that both air-
ports would be needed by the late 1990's, thus making it prudent to main-
tain \Void-Chamberlain and keep it in use.'° The Ham Lake site also
had the advantage that most of the land under consideration was either
marginal swampland or peat bogs or was being used only for farming or
sod farming. Consequently it could be assembled at a relatively low cost,
At tile same time, due to the marginal nature of much of the land, the
Commission felt that the likelihood of future development was less than
at other potential sites." Finally, the northeast boundary of the airport
Site was the Carlos Avery Wilcllife Management Area, a protected wildlife
preserve. Tile advantage to the MAC was that no development could take
place on this site of the airport, and as one person put it,'Birds do not
call up complaining about noise."
The decision to go with the Ham Lake site was made largely by the
MAC staff. In fact one person suggested that the Commissioners may have
been kept out of the decision until the staff had picked Ham Lake, but
this cannot be verified.'2 In any event, the first public notification came
when the MAC announced that it was going to hold public hearings, as
required by law, on a proposal to take the necessary land at the Ham
Lake site. Five hearings were held between April 1968 and December
1968, two for public testimony and cross-examination of the MAC stall
and tile others for the MAC staff and consultants to outline tile proposal
and specific hearings for other governmental agencies and for the air-
lines.13 Tile opposition to the proposal came from several groups.
9. MAC, "Findings," p. 35.
10. MAC, 'Findings," pp. 37—38.
11. MAC. "Findings," p. 33.
12. Harper, "The Airport Location Problem," pp. 558—562. This possibility was also
mentioned by several people interviewed in the course of this study.
13. Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Commission, "Chronological Sum-
mary MAC Consideration of Location of New Major Airport," Sept. 20, 1971. Hereafter
referred to as MAC, "Chronological Summary.""PEOPLE OR DUCKS?" WHO DECIDES? 361
Onevocal opponent was Northwest Airlines, supposedly acting as the
spokesman for all the airlines serving the Twin Cities. Their opposition
was over costs and competition.'4 Northwest is tied into expensive leases
for the existing terminal, overhaul, and storage facilities at Wold-Cham-
berlain. It feared that building a new airport would raise its costs consid-
ably. Given MAC's usual financial objective to be self-supporting through
user charges for airport space, this was a reasonable concern. In addition,
Northwest pointed out that virtually all its traffic was to the south of
the Twin Cities so that a northern site would measurably add to their
operating costs independent of the MAC's charges. At the same time,
Northwest argued that alltheir employees were now located on the
southside in the proximity of the existing field and that a northern loca-
tion would work a severe hardship on them.'5
There was an additional unstated reason for Northwest's opposition—
the potential of additional competition. A member of the Commission's
staff said that the most profitable run for airlines serving the Twin Cities
is the Chicago trip. This is how Northwest got its start and it now handles
about 70 per cent of the traffic on that run. Under the MAC plan which
would have kept Wold-Chamberlain open, Northwest feared that it would
then be possible for a third level carrier to obtain authorization for a
downtown-to-downtown run between Wold-Chamberlain and Midway in
Chicago. If this happened, it would seriously undercut Northwest's ad-
vantage on the Minneapolis to Chicago run. It was also apparent that for
financial reasons, the Airport Commission was not likely to agree to close
Wold-Chamberlain. As a result, Northwest was basically opposed to any
second airport, and all the more opposed if the new facility was going
north.
The second source of opposition was the environmentalists who feared
what the new airport might do to the quality of life in the Carlos Avery
Refuge and to the water table and water quality in the area.'6 The water
question was of particular concern to some people because much of St.
Paul gets its water from sources which would be affected by the airport
if the environmentalists' projections were correct. The environmentalists
were also concerned about the effect of increased noise on the wildlife and
on people's ability to enjoy the preserve. There were also several second-
14. Harper, "The Airport Location Problem," p. 562.
15. Northwest Airlines has continually cited thete reasons for their opposition to
a new major airport and particularly to a northern site. These points formed the basis
of an August 21, 1972 letter from the President of NWA, Donald Nyrob, to one of the
Council members prior to the most recent Council vote.
16. Harper, "The Airport Location Problem," pp. 562—563.
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ary questions; the effect of increased air pollution on the local environ-
ment, the possibility of birds being drawn into the jet engines, and the
likelihood of more frequent ground fog associated with the swampland
and high water table.
The third and least organized opposition group consisted of southside
businessmen and commercial interests.'7 Most of the past growth in the
Metropolitan area has been in the southerly direction. This can be attrib-
uted in part to the airport, although there were other contributing fac-
tors such as the construction of Metropolitan Stadium in Bloomington,
the opening of Interstate 494, and the presence and growth of Control
Data Corporation. One consequence of this development was the growth
of a large hospitality industry and other firms dependent on proximity to
air transportation. These businesses faced the loss of considerable revenue
or increased operating costs if a new airport were located at a northern
site and the volume of traffic at Wold-Chamberlain reduced. This oppo-
sition of course was partially offset by the support generated among north-
ern business interests and downtown interests that had been losing busi-
ness to the newer hospitality and retail concerns south of the city. These
downtown interests hoped that a northern site would mean increased busi. d
ness for them as they would now be the most proximate service area.'8
In spite of this opposition, the Commission voted unanimously on Feb-
ruary 24, 1969 to proceed with land acquisition at the Ham Lake site.
Although the Commission indicated that it looked at the five other sites, s
these are dismissed rather quickly in their report, called a 'Findings, Con-
clusions, and Order." 19Inthis document, the Commission put forth its
reasons for favoring the Ham Lake site as follows. s
1. Sufficient available land (15,560 acres). b
2. This landis suitable for airport construction in terms of slope and s
soil conditions and is comparatively cheap due to its unsuitability p
for alternative uses. L
3. Noise problems will be minimal because of the presence of the Carlos w
Avery area to the northeast, the reduced potential for further devel-
opment, and the ability to implement the proper zoning controls
over potentially usable land. ofi
17. Harper, "The Airport Location Problem," p. 563.
18. There was even one proposal to establish a direct nonstop rapid transit link
between the airport and downtown. This would further encourage downtown growth. 2
19. See footnote S."PEOPLE OR DUCKS?" WHO DECIDES? 363
•4. There would be minimal conflict with the airspace at Wold-Cham-
berlain and other general aviation fields.
5. The possibility of bird strikes was small and no worse than other
areas in the vicinity of the Mississippi River.
6. "The reduction in value of the game refuge is at this point specu-
lative and can only be determined after the airport has been in
operation." 20
The Commission report did not address the water quality and level
questions, the problems which might be encountered in constructing
runways and terminal facilities on the peat bog (although the Commis-
sion claimed that, "the predominant soil is fine sand which makes an ex-
cellent material for subgrade and subbase under pavement.. nor
with the airlines' contention that they would not operate out of two air-
ports and preferred a southern site.
The next step in the decision process was approval by the Metropolitan
Council. The Council had sixty days to decide whether it would concur
with the Commission, send the proposal back to the Commission for fur-
ther study, or reject it outright. In the event the Council decided on this
last alternative, the Commission could then go to the state legislature
asking them to resolve the dispute.
On April 24, 1969 the Council voted to suspend the Airport Commis-
sion's Order to begin land acquisition at the Ham Lake site.22 It con-
tended that the Commission had not adequately considered other sites
and that there were sufficient potential problems with the Ham Lake
site to warrant a more detailed examination of alternative sites. The
Council recognized those advantages to the Ham Lake site recommended
by the Commission. However, it felt that the potential problems were
such that more study of the specific qJestions was needed to make the ap-
propriate comparative analysis between Ham Lake and other sites. Ham
Lake might finally prove to be the most desirable site, but the Council
was not yet satisfied of that ott the basis of the MAC analysis and the
public hearings. The Council was primarily concerned about the poten-
tial impact on the water level and quality, the future use and enjoyment
of the Carlos Avery Refuge, the accessibility of a northern site to current
airport users who were assumed to reside on the southern side of the two
20. MAC,"Findings,"p. 34.
21.MAC, "Findings,"p. 34.
22.MetropolitanCouncil, Minutes of the April 24,1968 CouncilMeeting.7fl
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cities, and the Commission's view that two major airports were needed.
The vote of the Council was ten to four in favor of suspending the Com-
mission's order.23
At this point, Northwest Airlines entered (or was dragged into) the
discussion.24 In February, Northwest had proposed a 25 to 30 million
dollar expansion of its facilities at Wold-Chamberlain to accommodate
the new 747 jet planes it had on order. Less than two weeks after the
Council vetoed the I-lam Lake proposal, the MAC announced that it was
not approving the Northwest expansion. The Commission said that it
could not approve the expansion at Wold-Chamberlain until the question
of the new airport had been settled. The airline accused the Commission
of using this decision to try to coerce the airline into supporting the Ham
Lake proposal. The airline in turn threatened to build the new facilities
as well as move its existing operation to Seattle if the second airport were
$
built on a northern site and if Wold-Chamberlain were left open. Since
the airline employed about 6,000 people in the metropolitan area, this
was not a trivial threat from the communities' standpoint. The threat, of
course, brought charges that the airline was trying to blackmail and
coerce the Commission into dropping the Ham Lake site and pressuring
the Council into continuing to veto it if the Commission submitted the
proposal again.
On May 19 the Commission voted to resubmit the Ham Lake pro-
posal. New airport zoning ordinances had been passed by the state which
gave the Council the right to regulate land use for three miles outside the
boundaries of a new airport and up to five miles in certain directions if
that was deemed necessary. The MAC had also conducted a new airspace
survey which it hoped would satisfy the Council. This plan was submitted
to the Council on May 29 and the Council again had sixty days to re-
spond. Neither of these changes seemed to reduce the opposition to the
Ham Lake site, however. The MAC was also under considerable pressure
to change its mind on the Northwest expansion proposal. This was com-
ing largely from commercial interests, politicial leaders, and the news
media. On June 2, the MAC announced that it would approve the North-
west expansion and the use of 747s if the airline agreed to pay off the
MAC bonds in ten rather than thirty years. Ten years was the MAC esti-
23. Harper. "The Airport Location Problem,' pp. 567—568 and references cited
therein.
24. Harper, The Airport Location Problem," pp. 567—568, recounts this part of the
controversy in great detail.
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mateof the time it would take to get the new airport operational. On
June 4, Northwest announced that it was going ahead with an $8,000,000
expansion at Seattle to accommodate storage and training facilities for
the 747s. The airline implied that this was part of the 25 to 30 million
dollar expansion earlier planned for Wold-Chamberlain. Northwest also
stated that the remaining part of the expansion at \Vold-Chamberlain
P wasstill contingent upon the airport location decision. in a special meet-
ing called for later that afternoon (June 4), the Commission agreed to go
ahead with the 747 facilities at Wold-Chamberlain and to ask the Council
to stop further consideration of the new Ham Lake order in view of
Northwest's opposition.
The President of Northwest, Donald W. Nyrop, sent a telegram to the
mayors of Minneapolis and St. Paul saying that Northwest was with-
drawing its expansion requests and stated that before they were consid-
ered again the MAC would have to withdraw the Ham Lake proposal,
settle the one or two airport decision, presumably in favor of one, and
come to an agreement on how any new expansion or new facilities were
to be financed. Governor LeVander of Minnesota, a Republican, then
called for a meeting including himself, Nyrop, and the Commission, and
Council Chairmen. The result of this meeting was that the Commission
agreed to withdraw the proposal and to build the new facilities at Wold-
Chamberlain. At subsequent meetings between the staffs of the Commis-
sion, the Council, and the airlines, a statement was issued that called for
further study of the airspace conflict between Wold-Chamberlain and a
southern airport, of the fog problems at both sites, and an origins and
destination study of airport users. These ignored the more basic ques-
tions of the potential environmental problems and the future use of Wold-
Chamberlain.
While these studies were being conducted debate continued, although
at a lower level. The debate became focused on two questions. The first
issue was that of one versus two airports and the future of Wold-Cham-
berlain. The second was the related problem of the financing of a new
airport. Put quite simply, the MAC wanted to keep Wold-Chamberlain
open because of the large fixed investment in facilities there and the con-
siderable revenue generated by leasing the facilities to the airlines. If
Wold-Chamberlain were to be closed down, the airlines would be freed
from their obligation to pay the leases on the facilities. The MAC would
then be responsible for the debt on the existing facilities as well as the
debt incurred in building the new airport. The taxpayers of Minneapolis
and St. Paul would have to carry this debt through the property taxes.366 JOHNJACKSON
The Citizens League in a special study contended that this was the major
reason for the Commission's attitude toward Wold-Chamberlain.25 The
Commission also contended that it was senseless to close Wold-Chamber-
lain. They maintained that it was a well equipped airport and that at some
point in the future the demand for airspace in the Twin Cities would
be such that the second airport would be needed. Consequently it would
be shortsighted not to maintain Wold-Chamberlain, let alone shut it
down.
The airlines were taking the opposite view, particularly Northwest who
had the largest investment in facilities at the existing airport. Northwest
maintained that they would not operate out of two sites and were reluc-
tant at best to move to a northern site even if Wold-Chamberlain were
closed. The airline pointed out that if Wold-Chamberlain were closed, the
justifications for a northern site over a southern one on the basis of poten-
tial airspace conflicts were no longer supportable. Northwest then argued
that since most of the flights came from the southeast or southwest and
since a vast majority of employees and passengers lived on the southern
side of the Twin Cities, a southern site made much more sense.
$
While this debate was going on, there was mounting pressure from peo-
ple residing in the vicinity of Wold-Chamberlain to do something about
the noise problem created by the increased use of jets.26 Their demands to
reduce the noise levels resulted in the first critical involvement in airport
business by elected officials from either of the Twin Cities. Minneapolis
has a ward-based city council. The citizens of South Minneapolis, the
area adjacent to the airport, went to their councilor, Mrs. Gladys Brooks,
asking if she could get the MAC and the airlines to reduce the noise levels
and limit the noise to certain hours. Mrs. Brooks sent letters and pleas
to the MAC and the airlines requesting their cooperation and introduced
several city ordinances which would have restricted activity at the air-
port. She succeeded in stopping training flights and the testing of jet
engines at night, in limiting the use of certain runways,27 and in establish-
ing a noise abatement council, MASAC, which had representatives from
the MAC, the airlines, and citizens groups. These restrictions and the citi-
zen interference were seen as a severe inconvenience by the MAC.
25. Citizens League, New Airports for the 70's and After (Minneapolis: Citizens
League, 1969).
26. Stan Olson, "MASAC's Role," Airport Services Management Vol.12, No.10
(October 1971): pp. 24—26, and interview with Councilwoman Gladys Brooks, Aug. 23,
1972.
27. William K. Matheson, "Operational Procedures," Airport Services Management
Vol. 12, No. 10 (October 1971): pp. 19—20."PEOPLE OR DUCKS?" WHO DECIDES? 367
Thesenoise problems succeeded in generating additional incentives
and pressures to get on with a new facility and to close \Vold-Chamber-
lain or at least limit it to general aviation. During this time, the Council
reiterated its previous position that the new airport should be a replace-
ment for Wold-Chamberlain at least as far as commercial traffic was con-
cerned. In December 1969 the three parties agreed that a potential site
south of the two cities located at Rosemount-Farmington would be eval-
uated and compared to the Ham Lake site in the studies currently under
way.
During this period of the controversy the Federal government passed
and began to implement two pieces of legislation which specifically af-
fected the deliberations in the Twin Cities.28 The first was the Environ-
mental Quality Act of 1969 which stated that all federally funded projects
had to consider the environmental impact of the proposal and avoid
detrimental impacts whenever possible. The second was the Airport and
Airway Development Act of 1970. This latter bill supplements the first
by stating that the Secretary of Transportation must approve all new sites
or improvements before federal aid may be provided and that such ap-
proval may be forthcoming only after consultation with the Secretaries
of HE\'J and the Interior to determine the effects on natural resources.
Supposedly the Secretary of Transportation may not approve projects
which have an adverse effect on the environment if a feasible alternative
exists. If no such alternative exists, the Secretary must insure that all steps
will be taken to minimize such effects. The implications of these bills for
the deliberations in the Twin Cities are fairly obvious. Both the Commis-
sion and the Council initiated environmental impact studies by outside
consultants of both the Ham Lake and Rosemount-Farmington sites.
During the spring and summer of 1970 the reports of the different con-
sultants on airspace, meteorological, accessibility, andenvironmental
problems were completed and reported to the Commission. One of the
consultants, R. Dixon Speas Associates, summarized these reports in a
document prepared for the Airports Commission in October 1970.29 In
this summary the Ham Lake site is preferable to, or at least not inferior
on most grounds to the Rosemount-Farmington site on all criteria except
28. Robert Jorvig, 'Synopsis of Airport Planning, 1968—1971,' Metropolitan Council
Memorandum, August 11, 1971, P. 2, and Harper, 'The Airport Location Problem,"
Pp. 574—576.
29. R. Dixon Speas Associates, "Summary Report of Studies and Documents Related
to Twin Cities Metropolitan Area Second Major Airport Site Selection," October, 1970.
Hereafter referred to as Speas, "Summary Report."368 JOHNJACKSON
for a slight difference in potential accessibility.30 According to the origin
and destination survey and the projections made by the consultant for
the year 1985, the average trip length to Ham Lake would be 48 minutes,
compared to 42 minutes at Rosemount-Farmington. In terms of airspace
Ham Lake was clearly preferable because it would not interfere with op-
erations at Wold-Chamberlain. According to the report, a new airport at
the southern site could only operate at 70 to 80 per cent of the capacity
at Ham Lake for similar facilities because of the airspace conflicts. The
meteorological consultant said that both sites were equivalent from the
standpoint of meteorological interference. The main question here was
the potential incidence of ground fog. The consultants and a physics pro-
fessor from the University of Minnesota argued that there was no problem
in this regard and in fact the problem might be less than at Wold-Cham-
berlain.
On the environmental question, they concluded that the Rosemount-
Farmington site would require diversion of the Vermillion River, a small
feeder of the Mississippi River, but this did not involve any ecological
hazard because, "This river has not in the past received much attention
from conservationists and recreationists 31Withreference to the
Ham Lake site, the consultant claimed that the new airport "will not
necessarily adversely affect the ecological balance in the game refuge." 32 It
was further suggested that a cooperative refuge/airport system could en-
hance and protect Carlos Avery.
A refuge/airport system could be designed and negotiated, which would
provide a new concept in airport development and a more reasonable ap-
proach to otherwise conflicting needs of transportation and environment.83
Upon receipt of these reports, the Commission met and again voted
approval of the Ham Lake site. On November 9, 1970 the Commission
issued a "Revised Findings, Conclusions, and Orders" specifying that land
be acquired at the Ham Lake site for the construction of the new airport.
The Commission stated in its conclusions as follows.
This conclusion (to acquire the Ham Lake site) is essentially a reaffirmation
of the conclusion arrived at through the Commission's "Findings, Conclu-
30. Speas, "Summary Report," pp. 6—9.
31.Speas, "Summary Report," p. 9.
32. Speas, "Summary Report," p. 9.
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sions,and Orders" of February 24, 1969 as to the location of the new major
airport within the Anoka County lands studied and the subject of public
hearings, revised solely to meet the requirements to make the same com-
patible with its environs34
The Commission spent about 15 pages comparing the two sites and
justifying its selection of Ham Lake.35 These justifications pretty much
incorporated the consultants findings, as summarized in the R. Dixon
Speas Associates report. The accessibility of the southern site was mini-
mized, "...accessibilityto the two sites would be approximately equal
(favoring the southern site by five and one.half minutes),"while point-
ing out that the northern site was closer to the terminal handling most of
the air freight which moved through the Twin Cities in 1968. The final
aspects of the comparisons were the cost and financing estimates. At each
point, the Commission maintained that the southern site would be more
expensive. Land acquisition costs would be twice as much at Rosemount-
Farmington, site preparation would be 10 per cent more, and an addi-
tional S7 million dollars in highway construction would be needed to
provide adequate access to the airport. The conclusion of these findings
was that the Ham Lake site could be financed without recourse to
revenues from the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul. The Rosemount-
Farmington site, however, would require revenue from these sources.37
The Council wasted no time in beginning consideration of the Com-
mission's Order. The Council's referral committee held public hearings
on November 24, 1970. The Council staff prepared a long synopsis of the
current issues, the findings of the different consultants with respect to
• Ham Lake, and made a series of recommendations to the Council.38 For
the most part the Council staff agreed with the findings and conclusions
of the Commission. There were two major, highly significant, differences.
One was that the Council staff said that the new airport should be the
only commercial airport and that if Wold-Chamberlain stayed open it
should only serve general aviation.39 The second was that the Council staff
34. Minneapolis.St. PaulMetropolitanAirports Commission, "Revised Findings,
Conclusions, and Orders," November 9, 1970. Hereafter referred to as MAC, 'Revised
Findings."
35. MAC, "Revised Findings," pp. 33-47.
36. MAC, "Revised Findings," p. 43.
37. MAC, "Revised Findings," pp. 44—47.
38. Metropolitan Council, "Report of the Staff (Ham Lake Referral)," December 2.
1970. Hereafter referred to as MC, "Report of the Staff."
89. MC, "Report of the Staff," p. 14.370- JOHNJACKSON
was not as sanguine as the Commission about the environmental corn-
patibility of the airport and the natural resources adjacent to the Ham
Lake site.40 The Council staff claimed that,
It is clear that noise from the aircraft would have an adverse effect on man's
enjoyment of observing the wildlife in Carlos Avery and for this reason
would effect man's use of Carlos Avery.41
and in the next paragraph,
• ..itis clear that certain types of urban development will have an adverse
effect on the fish, waterfowl, fowl and small game habitat in this area.42
The staff ends up by concluding though that because of the Airport
Zoning Act
• .thestaff concludes that the airport can be built and operated com-
patible with natural resources by careful airport design and through opera-
tion of the Airport Zoning Act.43
On December 10, 1970 the referral committee met to make its recom-
mendation to the Council. In this recommendation, the committee agreed
that a new airport was needed, that it should be the only airport until at
least the year 2,000, and that the Ham Lake site could not be developed
without some permanent damage to the environment of the Ham Lake
area.44 The Council followed the recommendation of its referral commit-
tee by a 9—5 vote later on the same day. This amounted to a switch of one
vote from the decision made in April, 1969 when the vote was 10—4. The
reason given for the switch was that one Councilor had become convinced
that the new airport at Ham Lake did not pose a threat to the quality of
the water supply for the city of St. Paul.45
A map of the metropolitan area showing the Council districts, the in-
cumbent Councilors at the time of the two airport votes, and the airport
locations is given in figure 1. The Councilors and their districts voting
for the Ham Lake proposal on the first vote were: Craig (3), Pennock (5),
40. MC, "Report of the Staff," pp. 49—59.
41. MC, Report of the Staff," p. 52.
42. MC, Report of the Staff," p. 52.
43. MC, of the Staff," p. 59.
44. Metropolitan Council, "Report of the Referral Committee," December 10, 1970.
45. Statement of Mr. James Dorr to the Metropolitan Council, August 24, 1972."PEOPLE OR DUCKS?" WHO DECIDES? 371
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The councilmen antI their clistiicts arc as follows:
Chairnian—Janies L. Hetland. Jr.. Minneapolis.372- JOHNJACKSON
Dunne (6), and Maun (14). The Counselor to change his vote was Dorr &
(10).
When the Council transmitted its decision to the Commission, it in- a
cluded five suggestions for future action.46 They suggested that work a
should begin on selecting a new site and that Rosemount-Farmington
was a feasible site, but not the only one. It was also suggested that a long
range plan for the future use of Wold-Chamberlain be developed, includ- fi
ing future aviation needs, if any, and alternative uses of the land and c
buildingsfor commercial, industrial, residential or recreational purposes.
This was desirable, the Commission claimed, in view of the need to elim- rig.
mate the noise problem. The Council stated again that there should be
only one commercial airport and that all the airlines should be in agree- a/
menton transferring to the new airport and on any future uses of Wold-
Chamberlain. The Council also reiterated its position that the new site
should be developed so as to have minimum effect on natural resources
and allow for maximum joint airport and recreational use. Finally, the
Council suggested the formation of a committee composed of representa- eu
tives of the Council, the Commission, the airlines, and the environmen-
talists to consider potential sites anti to make a recommendation to the
Commission and to the Council. Included with these suggestions from the
Council was a letter from the President of Northwest Airlines recom- d
mendingthat there be only one commercial airport, that Wold.Chamber- a
lain should be phased out between 1978—82, that a southern site was pre-
ferred, and that NWA was willing to undertake the role as coordinator
between the airlines and the
The Airports Commission met on January 18, 1971 to consider the
Council's suspension order. At this meeing, the Commission affirmed its t
policy that no part of the cost of the new airport or of abandonment of
\Vold-Chamberlain shouldfall on the taxpayers of Minneapolis and St.
Paul. They also initiated a study assessing the financial impacts of closing (
\'VoId-Chamberlain. The essence of this report was a suggestion to acceler-
ate the payoff period for the existing debt at Wold-Chamberlain by rais-
ing the airlines rents and usage fees and concurrently relying on the air- c
lines to support bond financing for the development of the new airport. o
Predictably, the airlines strongly opposed this suggestion in a position
paper sent to the Commission in March, 1971 and signed by six of the
46. Letter from Mr. James L. HetlandJr., Chairman of the Metropolitan Council,
to Mr. Lawrence M. Hall, Chairman of the Metropolitan Airports Commission, De-
cember23, 1970.
47. MAC, Chronological Summary," p. 5.
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eightairlines serving Wold-Chamberlain. In this paper, the airlines also
stated that it was the job of the local authorities to decide on a new site
and the airlines were not going to assume the power of decision in this
area.48
No further formal action was taken during the remainder of the legis-
lative session which ended in the spring of 1971. Several bills had been
filed dealing with the airport question specifically and with the Airport
Commission and the Metropolitan Council generally. Since both of these
s. local bodies were created by the state legislature, the legislature has the
a- right to alter their powers, procedures and authorities whenever it wishes.
Although nothing came of these bills, their presence was enough to halt
e- any action by the Commission.
Later in 1971 the Commission and the Council agreed to establish the
Joint Committee suggested by the Council in its rejection letter in Dc-
cember, 1970. The only difference between the Joint Committee as estab-
lished and the Council suggestion was that it did not contain airline or
a- environmental representatives. It was constituted of eight members, four
a- from the Commission and four from the Council. This Joint Committee
Le had no formal powers, as people involved in the decision were quick to
point out.49 It was established as an ad hoc advisory body to both the
Council and the Commission and neither body was in any way bound by
any recommendations of the Joint Committee.
The advent of this Joint Committee instituted an important pro-
cedural change. The recommendation of this committee was not for a
specific site, but for a 'search area," and this recommendation then went
directly to the Council for consideration. The Council then considered
tS this recommendation in its airport systems Development Guide chapter
on airport systems. In writing and approving this chapter, the Council is
t. in a position of choosing between several areas. The decision puts the
g Council in the position of playing a positive decision-making role for the
first time and presumably gives the Council more control over the dcci-
sion. The Airport Commission does not have to go along with the Coun-
cil's decision and could continue to pursue the Ham Lake site or any
t. other alternative. However, it would be doing this in spite of a clear sig-
nal from the Council about what location is acceptable.
The Joint Committee agreed to consider four different sites. Two of
these were Ham Lake and Rosemount-Farmington. The two new ones
48. MAC, "Chronological Summary," pp. 5—6.
49. Interview with Mr. Raymond C. Glumack,Directorof Operations, Metropolitan
Airports Commission, July 17, 1972.374 JOHNJACKSON
were located slightly further from the downtown areas, one in the north I
and the other in the south and labeled the north and south search areas.
The Joint Committee met on July 24, 1972 to vote on its recommenda-
tion. This was one of the most interesting meetings of the prolonged con- a
troversy. The Committee took four votes. The first was a unanimous vote a
eliminating Ham Lake. Rosemount-Farmingtori was eliminated by a 7—1 a
count on the second vote. The dissenter was Marvin Borgelt, one of the f
Council members on the Committee. His Council district covered the en-
tire southern tier of the metropolitan area, including the Rosemount-
Farmington site. The third vote was on a motion to recommend the new c
southern search area. This motion did not pass on a 4—4 tie vote. The v
final motion was for the new north search area and 'this passed 4—3 with c
one abstention. t
The interesting votes were cast by Martin Companion, a St. Paul AFL-
ClO labor leader and the citizen member of the MAC appointed from St. p
Paul. He abstained on the vote for the north search area. Companion was
a close personal and political associate of David Roe, the leader of the e
state AFL-CIO and former Minneapolis citizen commissioner on the lq
MAC, who was supporting a northern site. A major concern of the unions gi
in both cities anti of the St. Paul politicians was the question of union s
jurisdiction at the new airport site. The Minneapolis unions had jurisdic- S
tion over any northern site while a southern site would belong to the St.
Paul groups. Several people mentioned this as one of the economic
siderations which had played a part in the controversy even though it
was pointed out Ofl several occasions that the MAC had always found a
way to spread contracts fairly evenly between representatives of the two a
cities. However the unions in both cities and some politicians were con-
cerned about this matter. Companion had previously stated however that t
he favored a northern site, but had not said why. At the time of the Joint c
Committee votes Companion had arranged with George Pennock, the f
Committee Chairman, to vote last on the final two motions. Pennock was I
a supporter of the northern site anti had voted for Ham Lake both times
it was considered by the Council. When it was Companion's turn to vote s
on the southern search area, he voted for the southern site saying he had v
received a telegram threatening his job if he did not vote for a southern n
site. This made the vote 4—4 and Pennock ruled that the motion had not t
passed. Companion also voted last, but then abstained on the motion to d
recommend the northern site. This resulted in the 4—3 vote with one ab- e
stention by which the motion passed. These two votes led to considerable
bitterness among the supporters of the southern site who claimed that
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Ii Pennock had arranged this tie by letting Companion vote last so the vote
was 3—3 when it was his turn to vote. Although Companion did not reveal
a- who sent the telegram, there was considerable agreement among observers
at the time that it came from the St. Pauls unions. This seems to be a case
of an appointed official following his personal interests rather than those
of a supposed constituency since all the elected St. Paul members voted
e for asouthernsite.5°
The Joint Committee's recommendation was received by the Metropoli.
tan Council and referred to the Development Guide Committee for in-
clusion in the airport systems chapter of the Guide. The Council con-
vened on August 24, 1972 to consider and take a preliminary vote on this
chapter. The only section to receive any attention was the discussion of
the location for a new airport. Within the Council, debate centered on
L. theeconomic questions. Environmental questions were no longer im-
;t. portant. Several councilors who voted against Ham Lake said they now
were supporting the new northern site because it did not have adverse
environmental impacts. The major economic concern was the economic
loss to the Bloomington-Richfield area specifically and the southern area
generally. This concern was countered by an argument that the northern
)fl sitewould "redress the economic imbalance in the metropolitan area."
.c. Several councilors emphasized that they felt the current circumstances
;t. not warrant proceeding with the new facility, but they were only voting
n- for the Development Guide chapter stating where a future airport should
it be located. Finally, several councilors felt it was important for the Coun.
a cil to use this opportunity to go on record making a positive statement
ro as to where a new airport should be to indicate they were not merely an
obstructionist agency. The Council then voted 9—5 to accept the draft of
at the airport systems chapter specifying the northern site. The councilors
casting no votes and their districts were: Borgelt (I) and Hoffman (7)
ie from the southern areas, Johnson (12) and Reed (13) from St. Paul, and
as Martens (11) who was opposed to any new airport.
es This will not terminate the controversy however. The Council must
te still hold public hearings on the airport chapter and then take a final
vote. The expectations were however that the recommendation for a
northern search area will stand. Then it is up to the Airports Commission
ot to decide if they want to proceed with plans for a new airport and if they
to do, if they want to locate it in the northern search area. There is consid-
b- erable speculation that the Commission may still come up with a plan of
le
at 50. This account was provided by Mr. David Rubin, Airports Program Manager for
the Metropolitan Council, in a telephone conversation August, 5, 1972.376- JOHNJACKSON
its own. The Executive Director of the MAC has publicly stated that he
found a proposal by a St. Paul city councilor to expand Wold-Chamber-
lain interesting and thought it had possibilities. Furthermore, three of the
St. Paul members of the Commission have indicated that they might vote al
against any northern site at this point. Under the rules establishing the
Commission, this will be enough to block a northern site. If this happens, Si
several people predicted that the state legislature may step in and restruc- 01
ture the Commission.
it
Influences on the Commission and Council Decisions
li
It should be quite clear at this point that the single function agency, the o
MAC, gave different consideration to the issues involved in the airport h
location question than did the multipurpose body, the Council. Further- aij
more, there were indications that the appointed officials responded to dif- wi
ferent concerns and interests than (lid the elected officials. The question
now is what have we learned about the ability of different governmental
structures to handle the conflicts inherent in public policy decisions from
the way these two organizations considered the issues in the airport loca- p
tion question. Unfortunately, given that we have only one case and several s
institutional differences, it is difficult to answer that question. It is not t
clear how much of the difference between the Commission and the Coun-
cil decisions may be attributed to the fact that one is a specialized admin- a
istrative agency and the other a multifunction policy body; that the Corn- S
missioners are elected officials, whereas the Councilors are appointed.
However, it is possible to make some observations about these structural
differences. 0
C
Single function and multifunction agencies o
The overwhelming majority of the MAC decisions were the decisions of
the MAC staff. The individual Commissioners seemed unconcerned about r
the operations and decisions of the Commission and gave the staff con- 0
siderable discretion on these matters. At least until the airport location
St
and noise questions arose, the Commissioners were continually accused
of being a rubber stamp for the staff.51 This lack of concern can be attrib.
51. Harper, "The Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Commission." pp. au
381. 393 and 398. (N"PEOPLE OR DUCKS?" WHO DECIDES? 377
utedboth to the structuring of the Commission itself and to the actions
r- of the staff who did a good job of avoiding problems which could arouse
IC the Commissioners' constituents. The staff seemed solely concerned with
te airport operations and with avoiding problems such as tax increases
which might cause the Commissioners to become involved in airport deci-
Is, sions. These two general objectives manifested themselves in the form
k. ofthree criteria which the staff imposed on a new airport location. The
MAC staff wanted to remain financially self-supporting, minimize poten.
tial air space conflicts, and avoid future urban development in the vicin-
ity of the airport.
Staying off the tax rolls of the two major cities substantially reduced the
likelihood of involvement by the Commissioners. Undoubtedly the may-
ors and councilors from the Twin Cities were more than happy not to
have the airport operation adding to their property tax rate. The taxing
arrangement of the MAC made some sense in 1943 when the Commission
was established and the two cities had over 80 per cent of the metro-
politan population. By 1970 this rate had fallen below 40 per cent, so
that these citizens would be certain to object to financing the airport
for the metropolitan area. The elected officials from each city, who com-
prise most of the Commission, can see this inequity and are likely to be
strong supporters of the 'zero-tax support" position. Thus, as long as
the operations of the airport could be kept off the cities' tax rolls the
Commissioners would be less motivated to participate in running the
airports and the staff would have more autonomy. Maintaining "zero-tax
support" necessitated keeping Wold.Chamberlain open and dictated the
two airport solution favored by the MAC.
Once the MAC staff decided that Wold-Chamberlain would remain
open, considerations of air space conflicts became very important. The
MAC staff was continually receiving professional accolades for its effi.
cient operations.52 Widely separated air spaces, which permit easier meth.
ods of aircraft handling and the minimization of traffic delays, are cer-
of tainly preferred from the standpoint of maintaining their professional
Ut reputation. Air space considerations virtually dictated a northern site,
once it was decided to keep Wold-Chamberlain in operation. Any southern
site which avoided a conflict with Wold-Chamberlain would have been
too far from either city to be practical. However, at one of the Joint Com-
b. mittee meetings an FAA official said it is possible to take a three climen-
52. Harper, "The Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan Airports Commission," p. 381,
P and John F. Judge, "The Minneapolis-St. Paul Dilemma," Air Line Pilot Vol. 41, No. 3
(March 1972), pp.6—9.
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sional view of the problem. This in effect means layering the approach a
routes rather than following the two dimensional view the Commission a
was taking by laying out rectangles on maps to define airspace.53 This ti
three dimensional concept provides more flexibility and airspace, but is
difficult to control. It would have meant that Rosemount-Farmington v
might be compatible with Wold-Chamberlain. The staff was not enthusi- d
astic about the idea and had either rejected it or had not considered it o
earlier. C
The final consideration to which the Commission seemed to give con- e
siderable weight was the potential for future urban development. Pre- i
venting potential development near the airport minimized future diffi-
culties from noise and pollution and the resulting demands that restric- hi
tions be placed on aircraft and airport operations. This consideration of
land usage favored the Ham Lake site with the refuge to the northeast and
its abundance of undevelopable wetlands, peat bogs, and marshland on
the remaining sides. On this criterion, Ham Lake was preferable to any
other site, north or south. This land also was available at the lowest price,
but the low potential for future development and the reduced airspace
problem, given that Wold-Chamberlain was to stay open, were the prime e
considerations in the Commission decision.
There is no question that the attributes the Commission was concerned
about—the minimization of airspace conflicts and the lower potential
for a noise problem—are to be valued in an airport site. But what are
these advantages worth? Locating the airport next to the refuge involved
some trade.off between the advantages of reduced airspace conflicts and
noise pollution and the costs of uncertain risk to wildlife and some damage s
to the value of the refuge, even though people could reasonably disagree
about the magnitude of the potential damage. The staff of the MAC
minimized both the amount and extent of these damages and were clearly s
willing to make the trade in favor of reduced airspace and noise pollution r
problems.54 e
The objectives and decision criteria of the Metropolitan Council are
not so easy to define. It would be easy to claim that the Council had the s
reverse view of the trade.off made by the Airports Commission since they
c
53. July 17, 1972 meeting of the Joint Committee.
54. One MAC staffer pointed out the relatively small amount of land involved by
showing what area the refuge would cover if placed adjacent to the existing airport.
In this case the refuge would extend well beyond areas currently experiencing any in-
convenience from air traffic. His conclusion was that the airport would not seriously
affect the preserve. Interview with Mr. William Olson, Project Engineer for the Metro-
f politan Airports Commission, July 17, 1972.
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ach approved a northern site after rejecting Ham Lake. However, this is prob-
ion ably not the whole case. To be sure, the Council and its staff did consider
'his the risk the Ham Lake site held for the Carlos Avery and for water qua!.
t is ity in the area. The switch from a 9—5 vote against Ham Lake to a 9—5
'ton vote for the new northern search area can be partly attributed to the re-
jusi- duced environmental risks associated with the new location. The veracity
of these statements was supported by the transportation planner for the
Council. In July he said several councilors had opposed Ham Lake for
on- environmental reasons and predicted they would vote for a northern site.
Pre- In addition, Mr. Dorr's stated reason for changing his vote on the Ham
liffi- Lakesite the second time it came up for Council consideration was that
he had been convinced by various consultants that it would not endanger
of water quality in the area. The Council also stated that possible harm to
the environment was one of the reasons for suspending the Commission's
on proposal each time it did so. Consequently it seems fair to conclude that
an)' the Council was giving more weight to the environmental risks than was
ice, the Airport Commission.
'ace There were several other considerations in the Council decisions, how-
ime ever, which complicate the analysis. The most important of these was the
question of the distribution of the economic benefits expected to be asso-
ned ciated with the airport. The Councilors votes in part reflected these eco-
tial nomic impacts, particularly after the environmental questions were set-
are tled. The lengthy arguments by Mr. Hoffman against the northern search
ved area, his and Mr. Borgelt's votes against this proposal, and the favorable
mci votes of the councilors from northern and western areas reflect these con-
age siderations. Councilors' votes did not always reflect the expected interests
ree of their districts on this matter, however. One councilor from a southern
AC district, Dennis Dunne, voted for the Ham Lake site and the northern
Irly search area. He was the President of the Minneapolis Chamber of Corn-
ion merce, and a suggestion was made that he was voting the Chamber's inter-
ests. The Chamber hoped that a northern site would help the downtown
are area regain some of the business it hat! lost to southern establishments
the since the expansion of the airport, the construction of the stadium, and
hey the growth of new manufacturing firms and their associated commercial
interests and population. The Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce had
come out strongly in favor of the Ham Lake site when it was first pro.
I by posed.
ort. The second dimension to the geographic issue was the split between
in- Minneapolis and St. Paul. In addition to the important question of union
jurisdiction, it was generally agreed that Minneapolis stood to gain more from
a northern site and St. Paul more from a southern one. This was380- JOHNJACKSON
particularly true if the new northern search area was selected, since it is
further west than Ham Lake. The implications of these city differences
were apparent in the three Council votes. Two of the three St. Paul mem-
bers of the Council voted against both Ham Lake and the proposed
northern search area. The only St. Paul councilor not to do so had been
the St. Paul citizen representative on the Airports Commission until late
1967, when he was appointed to the Metropolitan Council. The Minne-
apolis councilors had opposed Ham Lake, but when the votes were cast
for the new northern search area, three of the four Minneapolis councilors
voted yes. The no vote was cast by George Martens who said he opposed
building any new airport and thought the money could be put to better
use elsewhere,
The Airport Commissioners did not become concerned about the Min-
neapolis versus St. Paul question until after the Joint Committee decision
to go north, even though the two cities have equal representation on the
Commission. The new concern on the part of the St. Paul commissioners
is mostly attributable to a change in the membership. During the course
of the controversy the citizens of St. Paul elected a much more active
mayor and city council. Although these elections cannot be related
strictly to the airport issue, they changed the complexion on the Com-
mission.
There is one piece of evidence to suggest that the Council was func-
tioning as a general legislative body trying to consider the overall dis-
tribution of the economic benefits associated with different projects within
the metropolitan area. During Council deliberations on a proposal by
the Metropolitan Transit Authority to build a rail rapid transit system,
one of the councilors suggested deferring the vote until the airport deci.
sion came up. He then proposed to one of the other councilors that he
would vote for the rapid transit if the other member would support a
northern site. The offer was declined for any number of possible reasons,
such as the trade would not have changed the outcome of either vote.
Whatever the reason, it shows that the Council tried to relate the conse-
quences of one decision to an outcome on a different issue, particularly
with respect to the distributional question.
The final consideration which seemed to affect the Council's decision
was a consideration of Northwest Airlines interests. As was pointed out,
the airline was vigorously opposed to both the two-airport concept and
a northern site. The Council, although it eventually adopted a northern
site, consistently backed Northwest's demand for a single airport. This
seems to be more important to the airlines than having a southern site.
It is likely that the Council is more sensitive than the MAC to North-"PEOPLE OR DUCKS?" WHO DECIDES? 381
west's threats to move their operations elsewhere. If Northwest did go
through with this plan it could affect the local economy in a significant
fashion, particularly on the southside where most of the 6,000 employees
live. This may not be the only reason the Council supported the airlines,
but it is in a better position than the MAC to see the economic conse-
quences of a move by Northwest.
On balance it becomes difficult to say precisely what weight the Council
gave the various factors in considering and rejecting the Ham Lake pro.
posal and in selecting the new northern search area. They appeared to be
more concerned with the environmental effects, the economic impact of
the activity associated with the airport, and possibly the interest of a
large local business which would be significantly affected by the location
decision. It should be clear that the Council considered a much broader
set of issues than did the Airport Commission and its staff who were al-
• most solely concerned with their cash flow, airspace conflicts, and the ab-
sence of existing or potential urban development.
Elected and appointed officials
There are noticeable differences between the behavior of the elected and
the appointed participants in the airport location controversy. The dif.
ferences are not apparent until late in the case because the only elected
officials are the MAC Commissioners who played a minor role in the early
decisions to locate a new airport at Ham Lake. The Commissioners'
apathy toward Commission decisions suggests that unless officials are
elected directly to the decision-making agency and held responsible for
agency decisions in the eyes of the voters, they are not likely to be active
participants.
The first elected official to take an active role in MAC affairs was Gladys
Brooks, the Minneapolis city councilwoman, whose ward adjoins the air-
• port. In response to her constituents' complaints about the noise level at
Wold-Chamberlain she was able to get the MAC to agree to participate in
a sound abatement council and to restrict operations at Wold.Chamber.
lain. She subsequently requested and was appointed by the Minneapolis
city council to a seat on the MAC and served on the Joint Committee. She
has been a proponent of the new airport because it would alleviate the
noise problem in her ward and voted for the southern site on the Joint
Committee because it is more convenient to her district.55
S
55. These statements were made in an interview with Mrs. Gladys Brooks, August
23, 1972.
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The other elected official to take an active role in the case was Leonard
Levine, a young St. Paul city commissioner who was appointed to the
MAC in 1971. Levine proposed expanding the current airport by con-
structing a set of detached runways in Eagan Township, across the Min-
nesota River from Wold-Chamberlain. He came from the Highland Park
area of St. Paul, the part of that city closest to the airport. He was a
leader of the Highland Park Community Council which had been pro-
testing the increased air traffic noise. Levine first ran for one of the
St. Paul city commission positions, which are elected at-large, on a plat-
form advocating, among other things, a reduction in airport noise levels.
Levine opposed all four potential sites for a new airport. He opposed
Ham Lake because of its potential impact on St. Paul water quality. The
reasons he gave for opposing the new sites, both north and south, and
for his proposal to expand Wold-Chamberlain was that the new sites
were too far from the cities, that people would not use the new airport,
and that it would be another Dulles, which he pointed out was operating
at a deficit.
There are several representational explanations for Levine's positions.
The most important fact is that Levine must run at-large both to hold his
seat or to move to higher office. One reason for his opposition to a north-
ern site is simply that St. Paul would benefit more from a southern site.
The St. Paul AFL-CIO'of course was opposed to a northern site where
the Minneapolis unions have jurisdiction and union support is important
for any Democrat running at-large in St. Paul. Another reason is simply
the cost question. The MAC staff and their financial consultant estimated
that if the Council enforced the one airport requirement the new airport
would require tax support which would only come from the two central
cities. It is reasonable to expect that the people of St. Paul will object
to paying for the new airport since most of the metropolitan population
resides in the suburbs. This financial consideration may have been the
motivation behind Levines detached runway proposal, which would be
considerably cheaper. Of course this would not alleviate the noise problem
at Wold-Chainberlain and the citizens in its vicinity were strongly opposed
to Levine's proposal, as were the people of Eagan Township—who of
course do not vote in St. Paul. Several people said Levine was in trouble
with his constituents in Highland Park because of the proposal and his
opposition to a new airport. Presumably to counter this problem Levine
had the MAC authorize a poll in areas around the airposi on reactions to
the noise problem. The results of the survey purport to show that people
preferred to have a convenient airport, even at the cost of the noise prob-
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wasa few years ago. However Levine's critics were quick to point out that
the survey was taken while Northwest Airlines was still shut down by a
pilots' strike which had been going on for several months.
The individual councilors and appointed commissioners did not ex-
hibit the sort of constituency orientation shown by the elected officials.
The discussion of the Council's consideration of the economic impacts of
the airport location suggested that some of the councilors' votes, such as
Hoffman, Borgelt, and the northern members, were consistent with their
districts' interests. However there were also some which possibly were
not, such as Dunne's which was more consistent with the interests of the
Chamber of Commerce. The one versus two airport issue and the question
of Northwest's interests also suggests that some councilors may have been
influenced by personal considerations. Several of the councilors have per-
sonal economic interests which would be adversely affected if Northwest
were to move most of its operations to another city. One councilor is an
officer in a local bank, one founded the metropolitan area's largest depart-
ment store, and another is a local realtor. If Northwest were to substan-
tially reduce the size of its local payroll and transfer jobs out of the area
it would seriously affect the prosperity of all three concerns In addition,
one of these people was a personal friend of the president of Northwest
Airlines. The realtor voted no on all three votes anti stated his opposition
to any new airport. The other two men both voted against the Ham Lake
site and for the northern search area. However both said they were op-
posed to a new airport at the present time but were voting yes because
they felt the future of the Council required a positive vote. One of the
people interviewed who is close to both the Council and the airport deci-
sion said these economic and personal effects were strong enough to make
the councilors at least sympathetic to Northwest's interests, if not to vote
on those interests on several occasions.
The most interesting behavior from the representational standpoint
was Companion's votes at the last meeting of the joint Committee which
recommended the north search area. His arrangement with Pennock anti
his abstention on the vote for the north site were better expressions of
personal interest than of supposed constituency concerns. Companion
supported the north site in spite of considerable pressure from an irn-
portant St. Paul constituent group, the AFL-CIO, who supposedly threat-
ened him with the usual pressure reserved for elected officials. However
in Companion's case the threat was not effective, possibly because of his
tie to the state AFL-CIO leader. The fact that the elected St. Paul Com-
missioner on the Joint Committee voted for the southern site and that all
three elected St. Paul Commissioners have subsequently stated that they
jr
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will not support a northern site should indicate the extent to which Com-
panion deviated from the position preferred by his nominal constituency.
The votes of some of the councilors and Companion's behavior on the
Joint Committee indicate that personal preferences, private loyalties, and
personal objectives can play an important role in the decisions of ap-
pointed officials. Personal considerations are not absent from elected
officials' decisions although they seemed less important for the few elected
officials involved in the case. The major difference however is that voters,
if they are so motivated, can take sanctions against elected officials who
put their personal views above constituency concerns. In the case of an
appointed official, the question of sanctions is left up to the appointing
individual or body, or to private organizations such as the AFL-CIO or
the Chamber of Commerce. These may be of limited value if sanctions are
felt to be a useful or necessary control.
The decisions of the Commission and the Council and the behavior of
the individuals associated with both organizations support most of the ex-
pectations about the effects of institutional structure on public decisions.
The single function, executive type agency, the MAC, took a much nar-
rower view of the problem of locating an airport and gave much greater
weight to the issues of financing and operating the new facility than did
the Metropolitan Council, the general purpose, multifunction body. Sec-
ondly, the elected officials, such as Brooks, seemed more sensitive to con-
stituency concerns and less susceptible to private pressures and personal
considerations than did the appointed officials,like Companion and
Dunne, although this could only be examined in a limited fashion here.
These differences should be important when it comes to designing and
altering governmental institutions.
Who Decides and What Difference Does It Make?
The characteristic of public policy decisions which sets them apart from
private decisions and which presents a problem for the design of govern-
mental structures is the need to accommodate the legitimate but conflict-
ing interests and values associated with public activities. Conflicts arise
in part because of the collective nature of the decisions. We can use the
environment to support technological advances, such as air travel, or we
can use it to support wildlife and recreation. However we cannot do both,
at least to the degree that some people wish. Consequently there were con-
flicts in the Twin Cities over differences in the values attached to such
things as additional airport capacity, the reduction of aircraft noise in resi-
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dentialareas, the presence of a large bird sanctuary and the possibility
of harm to it caused by low flying planes, and avoidance of potential
damage to water quality if the swamp areas were drained and the water
runoff from the airport allowed to drain into the water shed.
A second source of conflict in most public decisions, and which was
apparent in the airport location decision, is that attempts to improve the
level, quality, or distribution of one public service invariably have sig-
nificant impacts on other public activities. In this case the initial decision
was to expand the capacity of the air terminal and to reduce the level of
noise pollution in populated areas. The consequences of that decision
were changes in the distribution of income in the region, as it is effected
by the level of economic activity, decreased enjoyment of a large wildlife
sanctuary, and major alterations in the accessibility of a major transpor.
tation and workplace center for many people.
The need for a collective decision on matters of land use and environ-
mental policy and the consequences of the airport location decision for
issues outside the field of air transportation were at the root of the con-
flicts in the decisions by the MAC and the Council. The behavior of the
MAC and the Council and of the members of these organizations suggests
that a multifunctional legislative type body whose purpose is to make
choices among different activities and to control the various operating
agencies can do a better job of mediating the conflicts generated by these
different activities and their consequences than the special function
agencies. An important characteristic of the Council in this regard is that
it has no operating responsibilities and is not in the position of trying
to sell people on the advantages of one particular activity, such as more
sewers, rail transit, or an expanded airport. The Council's sole function is
to insure that the decision process is sensitive to all the conflicting interests
associated with each activity. Mr. James Hetland, the first Chairman of
the Metropolitan Council, underscored this responsibility by saying that
the Council will be much more effective once it recognizes that it is not
supposed to completely agree with the different operating agencies, but
is supposed to be in conflict with them on the levels of service, where ac-
tivities will be located, and how they will be provided. He said the Coun-
cil's job is to make these decisions and that it necessarily involves disagree.
ing with the special agencies because each organization has different
functions to perform.5°
The experiences of the Metropolitan Council also suggest that a body
56. Interview with Mr. James L. Hetlaud, Jr., Vice-President, First National Bank of
Minneapolis, August 28, 1972.
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structured to include all the legitimate conflicts of interests involved in
public policy decisions and which has no administrative functions of its
own makes more appropriate use of its staff and the information they
provide than the executive agencies. The Council staff did not try to pro-
mote or even suggest a particular decision during the controversy. It pre-
sented its evaluations of the MAC consultant's reports and its own analy-
sis of the various consequences oLeach alternative on matters which con-
cerned the Council, such as aviation needs and economic and environ-
mental impacts. In each of its presentations the Council staff was sub-
jected to considerable cross-examination by the councilors. This cross-
examination usually brought out additional questions and considerations
relevant to the decision which the staff had not included, even though
they had tried to anticipate councilors' concerns. Consequently the Coun-
cil not only had control of its staff but was able to draw a considerable
amount of analysis out of it.
The better experiences of the Council with respect to its staff may be
accounted for by several explanations, even though we may assume that
the general objectives of the Council staff were similar to those of the
MAC staff in that both presumably had a strong professional orientation
and wanted to maintain their autonomy. In the first place fulfilling the
professional objectives of the Council staff did not require the promo-
tion of any particular public policies such as rail transit or additional
air space. Consequently the staff had less of a vested interest in the final
decisions of the Council from a professional standpoint. Secondly, because
the various interests involved in the decision were represented on the
Council, although possibly not in the most desired fashion, the staff was
subject to serious cross-examination which would have revealed biases
on their part. At the same time, because there were councilors with strong
interests on both sides of the issue, the best way for the staff to keep its
independence in the long run was to avoid taking sides or getting drawn
into the controversy in terms of promoting particular outcomes. In fact
one of the staff members of the Council involved in both the airport and
the transit issues said that his strategy was to stick with the analysis and
avoid the appearance of taking sides. The most likely circumstance in
which this strategy would break down is if one person or group came to
dominate the council decisions and thus to "own" the staff. However in
a multifunction body with many cross-cutting issues and interests it is un-
likely that such a dominant group could emerge.
It is important that a multifunctional body be charged with the task of
mediating the public policy conflicts and making sure that all the interests
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Themost obvious reason for this requirement is that much of the conflict
results because decisions in one area affect activities in other areas and
special function agencies cannot take account of these relationships. Be-
cause the Airports Commission does not have any responsibility for en-
vironmental matters or for regional income distribution there is no way
it can adequately arbitrate between those interests who want to get a
new airport and those who want to protect the bird sanctuary or those
who are concerned about the possible decline of economic activity in part
of the region. A multifunction organization whose sole responsibility is
to mediate the conflicts inherent in public policy decisions and whose
members are tied to the participants in the conflict by some means of in-
stitutional design, such as by district constituencies, stands a better chance
of at least debating the programmatic conflicts.
A second important reason for having decisions made by a multipurpose
body is its ability to execute side payments among groups who have op-
posing interests. There were no apparent examples of this taking place in
this case, however. The closest the Council came to doing this was the
councilor who supposedly suggested that his vote on the rail transit ques-
tion could be tied to promises to vote for the northern search area. In
part the absence of visible side-payments or log-rolls may have resulted
from the fact that each area wanted to get the airport rather than pre-
vent its presence. In most cities the contrary is true; each area is fighting
to block the construction of the airport in their vicinity even though they
may agree in theory that a new facility is needed. We could envision a
situation where the citizens in south Minneapolis, Highland Park, and
Eagan Township, for example, were trying to force the construction of a
new airport to get rid of the noise problem and airport users were de-
manding a new facility because of congested conditions at the current
one but wanted to maintain the convenience of the existing location.
Each time the local authority proposed a possible site the citizens of that
area would get sufficiently aroused to block the proposal either through
public hearings, the state legislature, or court proceedings. A multifunc-
tional body such as the Metropolitan Council, if they had control of the
various functional agencies, could then arrange a set of side-payments
or log-rolls whereby any area willing to accept the airport could be prom-
ised additional positively valued services, such as mass transit, parks, etc.
These types of side-payments in kind are about the only compensations
possible in the public sector because it is not possible to explicitly reduce
the tax rate in one area simply because it agrees to accept certain costs in
the form of undesirable activities. These compensations can only be ac-
complished by an organization which has control over the operations ofT
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the various specific departments or agencies. In this regard, Mr. Hetland
also said that for the Council to become effective it had to have the ability
to get budgetary control of the operating agencies, such as the Sewer
Board, the Transit Commission, etc. so that the Council had some control
over how the operations were conducted and which areas received what
kind of services.57
The requirements for membership and the procedure used to select
members are also important in how well different interests will be con-
sidered. One of the characteristics which made the Council more effective
than the Commission was the fact that Council members represented
specific geographic districts throughout the metropolitan area, even
though the Councilors were not accountable to their districts and some
did deviate from district concerns. Since the interests affected by most
public decisions are not uniformly distributed over a metropolitan region,
a geographic pattern of representation means the various groups with an
interest in the decision are likely to be explicitly included in the delibera-
tions. This is certainly not the case with the MAC or with many single-
function agencies where the governing board, the commissioners, or the
directors are appointed for their expertise, political connections, etc.
and without regard to any systematic representational criteria. The ques-
tion of apportionment is clearly important and application of the one-
man, one-vote criteria would surely be a necessity. A Council of Govern-
ments in which Eagan Township or the other suburban communities had
an equal voice with Minneapolis or St. Paul would distort the representa-
tional gains made by moving to a Metropolitan Council type legislature.
The Council solves this problem by making Council districts coterminous
with state legislative districts which by law should be apportioned equally.
The procedure used to select the members of the legislative body does
have an important bearing on how various interests will influence public
decisions. Elected officials seem to be more concerned with the interests
and concerns of their immediate electoral constituency and less influenced
by outside private organizations and personal considerations than ap-
pointed officials. 01 course elected officials are not immune from these
latter influences, but they presumably give relatively less weight to them,
particularly if the elected office constitutes a full time occupation. Though
not particularly surprising, this is an important observation when corn-
bined with the previous observation that membership on the decision
57. Interview with Mr. James L. Hetlaisd, Jr., Vice-President, First National Bank of
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makingbody should be district based. The logic for requiring elected
officials is that they are more likely to insure that various interests are
represented in the decision process and have an opportunity to express
themselves in an influential way. Numerous people, including several
incumbent councilors, in discussing the future of the Council, said it was
a necessary and hopefully an imminent step to make the council an
elected body. Their reasoning was precisely the argument presented here.
Since the councilors' function is to insure that the various metropolitan
interests are taken into account in planning and development decisions,
it is necessary to have them elected by the people who hold those interests.
The implications of this case and the conclusions of this paper are
quite straightforward. The best way to insure adequate consideration of
the legitimate interests associated with decisions in the public sector is
by a multipurpose legislative type body which has jurisdiction and con-
trol over the various functional agencies or departments and whose
members are elected from equal sized districts throughout the area af-
fected by the decisions.
COMMENT
Richard E. Quandt, Princeton University
The problem of locating an airport provides an almost ideal framework
for discussing some important questions that often arise in large public
investment projects. These include some very general questions such as
(a) how one should quantify, for purposes of a cost-benefit analysis, cer-
tain items that are generally regarded as defying quantification and (b)
whether certain requirements, frequently of an environmental nature,
should be regarded as inviolable constraints upon the airport location
decision or whether they should be quantified and entered into the ob-
jective function. On a more specific level airport location problems force
us simultaneously to deal with policy variables (land-use and regional
planning targets), enclogenous variables (traffic generation, modal split,
air traffic control, surface access, etc.) and exogenous variables (meteoro-
logical and geographic data). John Jackson's fascinating and at the same
time somewhat depressing case history of the Minneapolis airport loca-
tion problem focuses on one particularly important aspect, namely on
the nature of the body (or bodies) responsible for making the location
decision and on the possible consequences for the ultimate decision of
the composition and aims of such bodies. His basic finding is that a
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multifunction legislative body with elected members representing all
affected constituencies is the most suitable type of body because (a)it
can do a better job of mediating conflicts that arise in connection with
the airport location decision, (b) it can better execute side payments and
provide compensation to those whose interests may be injured by the
decision, and (c) it can be expected to be more responsive to the interests
of the electorate.
These are reasonable conclusions and it is not my aim to challenge
them. Rather I should like to consider further (a) some of the particular
problems involved in locating a new airport, (b) the entire locational
decision-making process with specific reference to what is probably the
most systematic and massive effort in this regard, namely the work of
the Roskill Commission on locating the third London airport.
It may be difficult to measure precisely when a process designed to
produce an airport location decision was in fact initiated, in Minneapolis
this process started no lates- than 1968 and, as far as I understand, has
not terminated yet; nor is there any promise of speedy termination in
the future. The mind boggles at the thought of how long the fourth
New York jetport has been under discussion. In contrast, the appoint.
ment of the Roskill Commission and its terms of reference were an-
nounced in the House of Commons in May 1968; the Commission com-
pleted its inquiry and produced its report by late 1970 and a decision
was made by the Government in April 1971. In spite of the fact that
there had been discussions and white papers concerning a third London
airport prior to 1968, the Commission appears to have been justified
in its rather understated view that "The story of the fourth airport in
New York is, we believe, longer than the story of the third London
airport." 1
'Whatis the source of the difference? In Minneapolis at least the story
appeal-s to be one of a sequence of paralyzing strokes and counterstrokes
by the Metropolitan Council or the Metropolitan Airports Commission,
or by Northwest Airlines, or representatives of South Minneapolis in-
terests or representatives of St. Paul interests, etc. Itis bad enough to
have the Commission and the Council, with their significantly different
mandates and functional aims, both involved in the decision making
process; this is compounded by blackmail by private business interests
and by the conflict of interests that atises from the [act that any Minne-
apolis airport, as indeed many others including the New York airports,
1. Commission on the Third London Airport, "Report," HMSO, 1971, P. 6. Here-
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wouldlie near the boundaries of several municipalities or jurisdictions
each of which must concur in any decision.
The contrast between the decision making structure in Minneapolis
and the Commission on the Third London Airport is enormous. The
members of the Commission were appointed by the President of the
Board of Trade for the single task of recommending a site, if any, for
the third London airport. They themselves had no vested interest in
the decision to be made; they were neither to be reelected by any con-
stituency nor reappointed by any authority to a body with continuing
existence. Their recommendation was to be macic directly to the Govern-
ment. Among their members we find a judge (the Chairman), three pro-
fessors(of transport, economics, and aircraft design, respectively),a
partner in an engineering firm, an inspector from the Department of the
Environment and the deputy chairman of a large business firm. The
terms of reference given to the Commission specifically instructed its
members to consider questions of planning, noise, agriculture and en-
vironment, air traffic control, surface access, and defense and to employ
cost-benefit analysis. The Commission felt, and nobody would accuse
any of the participants in the Minneapolis situation of harboring similar
anxieties, that "Not the least of the tasks facing the Commission upon
its appointment was the need to establish public confidence that its
work would be impartial, unbiased and entirely uninfluenced by any-
thing which had gone before." 2
Thework of the Commission proceeded in five stages. In the first stage
public and commercial organizations were invited to present evidence
on problems of regional planning, noise, surface access, etc. and extensive
hearings were held. Next local hearings were held at potential sites and
the Commission welcomed the formation of "resistance groups" in the
various localities. In the third stage the Commission's Research Team
engaged in detailed investigations of all aspects of the airport location
• problem from traffic forecasts to questions of locating particular run-
• ways, etc. This was followed by discussion among outside experts and
the Research Team. The final stage consisted of one more set of public
hearings. The outcome of allthese deliberations was an impressive
tableau in which the Commission listed for each of the four potential
sites on the short list (Cubhington, Thurleigh, Nuthampstead, Foulness)
some 20 categories of associated cost.3 Not all costs were explicitly entered
2. Commission, "Report," p. 10.
3. One may fault the procedure because of its omission of computing explicit bene-
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here. Neither the destruction of the breeding grounds of the brown
bellied Brent goose that would result from locating the airport at Foul-
ness nor the destruction of Stewkley Church, said to be the finest example
of Norman architecture in England, that might occur if Cublington
were selected were explicitly quantified. Yet the Commission attempted
to determine all costs, whether these were actually to. be incurred as in
the case of airport construction costs or whether they were purely no-
tional as the cost figures associated with noise pollution. In all this work
the Commission attempted to view the matter in a general equilibrium
framework. Examples of this range from purely technical matters to
rather broad policy questions. Among the former we find that the con-
struction of the airport at Foulness (but not at the other sites) would
have necessitated an expansion of the relatively minor airport at Luton;
the increase in noise at Luton was appropriately attributed to Foulness.
Among the latter we find the attempt to coordinate with the South East
Joint Planning Team, an independent government body responsible for
developing and implementing regional plans for the South East region.
They attempted to obtain at least qualitative indications of undesirability
even in those matters where they abandoned the hope of quantification:
it turned out that Stewkley Church could be moved whereas the Brent
geese appeared to be resistant to persuasion to change their habitat.
The sum of all costs was a minimum for the Cublington site and this
is the site that the Commission recommended.
Although the comprehensiveness and the dispatch with which the Re-
search Team and the Commission dealt with the task at hand are im-
pressive, these characteristics do not insure that all analyses and, indeed,
the final decision itself are correct. It must be recorded that the work of
the Research Team, its methodology, its data and its assumptions have
come under serious fire from a number of scholars, engineers and con-
sultants.4 Nor does a decision-making structure such as the Commission's
demand, the benefits from providing additional capacity were in fact postulated rather
than demonstrated empirically. This aspect of the Roskill procedure is particularly
subject to criticism in the light of the opinions that emerged during the latter part of
the Commission's work to the effect that existing airport capacity at Heathrow, Cat-
wick, Luton and Stansted, with possible additions, was adequate to meet the foreseeable
demand until sometime in the 1980's. See "Who Needs Wing." Economist (December
26, 1970): 65—67.
4. See for example, J. Parry Lewis, "Misused Techniques of Planning: The Forecasts
of Roskill," Regional Studies 5 (1971): 145—155; F. A. Sharman, "The Third London
Airport," Regional Studies 5 (1971):135—143; N. Lichfield, "Cost-Benefit Analysis in
Planning: A Critique of the Roskill Commission," Regional Studies 5 (1971): 157—183;
E. J. Mishan,What is Wrong with Roskill," Journal of Transport Economics and
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guaranteethat the criteria of decision making are uniformly accepted:
one need only point to Buchanan's dissent from the majority opinion
in which he (a) rejects the compelling nature of an explicit cost-benefit
calculus and (b) tends to treat environmental consequences as absolute
constraints rather than part of the objective function. Be that as it may,
the majority of the Commission accepted the principle of decision making
expressed in the following:
We believe therefore that, following our refusal to accept the existence
of any absolute constraint upon the choice of site, the right answer in the
interests of the nation rests in a choice of site which, however damaging to
some, affords on a balanced judgment of advantages and disadvantages the
best opportunity of benefiting the nation as a whole.5
It seems to me that the principal differences between the cases of
London and Minneapolis are three-fold.(1) The Roskill Commission
explicitly adopted an overall cost-benefit calculation and the aggregate
of miscellaneous participants in the Minneapolis case have not. That is
not to say that the examination of issues in the case of Minneapolis did
not, item by item, consider the same issues as the Roskill Commission
did, such as noise, environmental factors, surface access, air traffic con-
trol, regional impact, etc. It is just that there seems to be no evidence
that (a) all these items were costed out according to some reasonably
objective and uniform methodology and (b) that all costs were aggre-
gated for purposes of making a final decision. (2) A second and not un-
related difference is that in the Roskill case the principals had no vested
interests, did not represent constituencies with veto powers and could
be regarded as repositories of a social welfare function as much as this
could ever be hoped. These two differences are responsible for the fact
that a recommendation was made speedily and for the belief that it had
been arrived at fairly and rationally.° (3) The ultimate decision-making
body in the Roskill case was the national government, satisfying Jack-
son's requirement that the decision be made by a multifunction elected
body, but one much broader in scope than the particular decision at
hand. Although elected, many of the participants in the final decision
5. Commission, "Report." p.
6. Not all observers are fully agreed on this latter point. Thc Commission has been
severely criticized by some for being neither a fair nor an entirely rational decision-
making body.
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could not have had as specific a vested interest in it as did the members
of the Minneapolis Metropolitan Council.
In contrast, the Minneapolis case appears to be characterized by a
decision-making process in which (a) those responsible for making the
decision had a strong vested interest, (b) they could effectively block
action, and (c) it never became necessary to evaluate the aggregate cost-
benefit. The only major advantage of such a procedure is that no decision
need be made until and unless an appropriate process of compensation
is agreed upon. Although the Roskill Commission was fully aware of the
need to compensate the losers from any rearrangement in the social
fabric, the structure of the Commission did not ensure that such corn-
pensation would actually be paid; rather this matter was left up to the
Government and Parliament. These considerations must have influenced
the Government to reject in April, 1971 the site recommended by the
Commission and to choose Foulness instead. The principal reason for
this seems to have been the persuasive nature of the arguments put forth
by Buchanan who felt that the environmental damage at Foulness was
less than at the other sites. Added to this was the apparently growing
concern that some of the intangibles, the cost associated with noise
pollution, the defacing of the Buckinghamshire countryside, etc., had
not been correctly evaluated in the cost-benefit analysis. Since no ade-
quate mechanism of compensation could be devised, the Government
preferred the site with the lesser environmental damage and possibly
lesser cost to the nontraveling public. In the Minneapolis case, and cer-
tainly under Jackson's preferred system, the guarantee of compensation
can at least in principle be made part of the price for agreeing to a
decision at all. But the need for compensation ought ideally to be as-
certained by some objective criterion by objective investigators; it ought
to be fixed in magnitude by a broadly constituted legislature and ought
not depencE on the relative bargaining strengths of a very small number
of people. Consequently, although one must agree with Jackson that
among the systems that are at least partially present in die Minneapolis
case, a multifunction body of elected representatives for decision making
is preferable to other alternatives, I find it difficult to ignore the ad-
vantages of Roskill.